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Cybersecurity & Compliance

Why Phishing-Resistant MFA Still Isn't Universal

Cybersecurity & Compliance

5 min read

Phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication — hardware security keys and platform passkeys using public-key cryptography — has existed in mature, usable form for years. Most organisations still run on SMS or app-based one-time codes, which remain genuinely phishable through real-time relay attacks.

The gap isn't that the better option doesn't exist. It's rollout friction, device management overhead, and legacy application support that keep organisations on the weaker option longer than the threat landscape justifies.

Why the weaker factor is still phishable

A real-time phishing proxy can relay a one-time code or push approval from a victim to the real login page within the code's valid window, defeating the second factor entirely without needing to break any cryptography — a well-documented, actively used attack pattern.

Phishing-resistant methods close this specific gap because the cryptographic challenge is bound to the legitimate origin; a relay attack has nothing to forward that would validate.

What actually blocks faster adoption

Legacy applications without modern authentication support, device provisioning logistics for a distributed workforce, and the perceived cost of hardware keys are the real blockers — all solvable with a phased rollout prioritising the highest-risk accounts first, rather than requiring an all-or-nothing migration.

The better factor isn't missing. The rollout plan is. Start with the accounts that would hurt most if phished.MNB Security Practice

Key actions

  • Prioritise phishing-resistant MFA for the highest-risk accounts first
  • Identify legacy applications blocking modern authentication support
  • Phase the rollout rather than requiring an all-or-nothing migration
  • Retire SMS/app-based codes as the sole factor once resistant options are viable

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